This paper investigates the eect of performance measurement on the optimal eort allocation by employees, when rms are concerned about retention of employees with higher abilities.
Introduction
Oftentimes, the management of an organization is concerned with multiple objectives when creating an incentive structure for employees. Broadly speaking, one can divide them into the objectives linked to inducing the desired performance, and those objectives linked to hiring and/or retaining the most productive employees. The former include the objectives to induce employees to exert the optimal eort level overall and to allocate this eort optimally across the activities contributing to overall productivity. These are already non-trivial tasks when eort and eort allocation cannot be observed directly; nding the optimal incentives' design for this set of objectives may be especially dicult when employees are heterogeneous. If employees are heterogeneous in a vertical dimension (ability), the second set of objectives (employee hire and retention policy) is also important and non-trivial. As is the case with eort allocation, the employees' abilities are also usually not directly observable. Various performance measurements are commonly used to evaluate an employee's ability for subsequent retention eorts as well as to incentivize the employees' eort level and its allocation between productive activities.
The optimal design of the compensation packages (contracts) oered to employees involves providing the right incentives for the eort level and eort allocation choices of the employees subject to the individual rationality constraints (the value of the contract should not be worse than the value of the employee's outside option). Naturally, the individual rationality constraints may also be unknown to management. This means that from the management's point of view, the higher the value of the contract to an employee, the less likely the employee is to leave the organization. Usually this implies that the higher the employee's ability, the better the contract parameters that management should oer to the employee. 1 1 When the contract rewards performance, and performance is correlated with ability, the same contract has a higher value to an employee with a higher ability. Therefore, contracts with the same parameters may be more likely to retain employees with higher abilities. However, one can empirically observe that it is usual for the parameters of the contract oered to an employee with better estimated ability (historical performance) to newal introduces a dynamic inconsistency problem of the current objective of incentivizing eort and its allocation and the future objective of retaining employees whose record suggests better abilities.
2 Since employees are forward-looking and can expect this inconsistency, introduction of a new metric results not only in an enlargement of the set of the available instruments for the management, but also in a change of the employees' environment. While the larger set of instruments could help to achieve the management's objectives and increase social welfare, the dynamic inconsistency could be detrimental. The net eect is not immediately clear.
In this paper, we show that the net eect could be negative by formalizing the following intuition. Suppose that the total eort a particular employee would exert is essentially xed (i.e., not easily changed by incentives), and that in the absence of additional performance measurement(s), employees are incentivized to allocate eort across two components in an ecient way. However, suppose the existing incentive to allocate eort eciently (using the existing measurements) is not particularly strong, so that an employee would distort his eort allocation if a new, non-negligible incentive to do so is introduced. For example, management may be able to observe and enforce the time spent at work, and any allocation of time across activities may not impose a disutility on the employees so far as they have to spend that time at work. In this case, a slight weight on overall output of the organization, even if this output is only weakly correlated with the eort allocation of a given employee, is sucient to induce the employee's optimal eort allocation. As a result, the system is working nearly perfectly. Dierent employees contribute dierently to the total output due to their dierent abilities, but each does what he can (providing the eort he is capable of and eciently allocating it across the eort components), and nothing can be done about the abilities themselves. In order to simplify the presentation, we will identify the total eort the employee is capable of with the employee's ability. Now suppose that due to a random value of the outside option (e.g., due to the changing preferences for living close to the current employment area), each employee may leave employment at the beginning of each period, but this decision may, at least for some employees, be aected by the compensation that he is oered. Then, to encourage the better employees not to leave the organization 2 Even if long-term contracts are possible, unless management can commit not to give out bonuses (which are not fully spelled out in the contract), the implicit nature of incentives remains present.
through an appropriate retention policy, i.e., by oering a better next period contract to the better employees, management is interested in evaluating its employees' abilities.
Suppose further that the feasible measurement under consideration is the measurement of one, but not all, of the eort components. Note that without this additional performance measurement, given the optimal eort allocation, the employee's ability (total eort) is perfectly correlated with each of the eort components. Then an employee's ability could be perfectly judged from either component. This seems to provide a compelling argument for introduction of the performance measurement, even though it only measures one of the eort/performance components. However, knowing that management will oer a better contract in the next period to those employees who performed better on the measured component, if management starts measuring one of the dimensions of eort, and even if no weight is placed on it in the current compensation schedule, employees will distort eort allocation toward that dimension in hopes of securing a better contract oer in the next period. If this distortion is not costly for the employees, all eort may be allocated to only one component, thus, possibly having a negative eect on the total output.
But would not management then be able to adjust the current compensation package to eliminate this distortion, perhaps through a negative weight in the current contract on the performance component measured? The answer is: generally, no. The reason, again, is employee heterogeneity. Generally, one might expect that employees would have some independent and private estimate of their likelihood of staying with the organization next period. Therefore, the best management can hope to achieve with the optimally designed reverse incentives contract is that some employees, knowing that they are more likely than average to leave, will be incentivized by the reverse incentive to distort the eort towards the other component, while most of the remaining employees, having a higher likelihood to stay than management estimates, would still distort their eort toward the measured component. The outcome is that, while any aggregate mix of eort allocations can be achieved, almost all individuals may end up allocating eort ineciently.
Note that perfect information, if costlessly available to management, should be welfare en-hancing. However, imperfect measurement, insofar as it measures some, but not all, of the components of productive output, is likely to distort eort allocation. While this measurement can be used for better retention and a better total eort incentive policy, these improvements are at the expense of the eciency of the eort allocation. Furthermore, inability to commit to future contracts means that this asymmetric measurement problem may not be feasible to fully resolve.
3 Therefore, when deciding on whether to introduce a partial (or imperfect) measurement (i.e., a measurement that weighs some of the eort/output components heavier than others), the management needs to decide whether the problems of the eort enforcement and employee retention are more important than the problem of eort allocation. Thus, the common practice to collect the data rst; decide what to do with it later could be a treacherous path even if the management is fully rational and benevolent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents the model, and Section 4 considers the cases when measurement is not possible, and when measurement is available on the rst period eort level. Section 5 presents the eect of measurement being also possible on the second period eort choice, and Section 6 concludes. The proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Related Literature
This paper builds on the extensive literature on the principal-agent and salesforce compensation problems.
4 This literature, in particular, explores the optimal weights the principal needs to place on measurements to account for the eort distortion across multiple tasks (e.g., Holmstrom and 3 Management can oer long-term contracts, but the problem is that once management sees evidence of high ability and given the probability that the employee quits, it would then oer retention bonuses to some workers.
That is to say, a commitment to never use the measurement is not renegotiation-proof. One could also envision slavery contracts" that commit the employee to work forever. Although such contracts would solve the issue of commitment (since retention is no longer an issue), they would result in ineciency since due to the random outside options (if they are not perfectly predictable by the employees), sometimes it is ecient for an employee to leave. From a protability standpoint, such contracts would come at the expense of oering a higher base salary up front. Thus, the negative value of measurement would persist even if slavery contracts are allowed.
4 See, for example, Basu et al. (1985) , Rao (1990) , Raju and Srinivasan (1996) . Milgrom (1991) show that when the eort distortion between tasks is suciently severe, at pay (i.e., contracts ignoring performance measurement) may be optimal, and discuss how it applies to the ongoing teacher compensation debate. Hauser et al. (1994) explore making the incentive scheme based on customer satisfaction measures as a way for employees to put eort on dimensions that have longer term implications. Bond and Gomes (2009) explore the ability of the principal to aect a multi-tasking agent's eorts. The literature has also discussed what happens in a dynamic setting with the question of desirability of long-term contracts (e.g., Malcomson and Spinnewyn, 1988) and renegotiation-proofness. One usual assertion is that the principal and welfare are not hurt by more information (measurement), but this is due to the assumed ability of the principal to put a suciently low weight on what is being measured. Alternatively, we consider the problem of the principal's possible inability to commit to the future contracts and show that the optimal contract in the presence of more information (more performance measures) may lead to decreased protability and social welfare.
Cremer (1995) considers a dynamic consistency problem of the principal's commitment to incentivize eort by the threat of ring the agent. Assuming that the agent values job renewal, Cremer shows that in some cases, the principal would like to commit not to observe information about the reason the agent fails in order to increase the agent's incentive to perform. By not observing the reason for failure and therefore eectively committing to re the agent if output is not up to a standard, the principal is able to circumvent the positive-pay restriction and increase the incentive for the agent to perform well without increasing the expected pay. In contrast to Cremer, we examine the opposite problem: when the principal would like to commit not to incentivize the agent. Dynamic (in)consistency issues have been studied in various other contexts, such as a durablegoods monopoly setting prices over time (e.g., Coase 1972, Desai and Purohit 1998) , and central bank policies on money supply (e.g., Kydland and Prescott, 1977) . In this paper, we essentially 5 Some measurement can also be obtained on the market conditions by allowing lobbying by sales people on the incentive scheme (e.g., Simester and Zhang, 2014). consider the implications of the dynamic inconsistency issue in a principalagent framework.
The Model
Consider a principalagent model with agents having dierent abilities and interacting with the rm (principal) during two periods, indexed by t = 1, 2. Since we abstract away from any eects of one agent's behavior on other agents or the incentives the principal has in treating other agents, we consider, without loss of generality, a single agent whose type is uncertain to the principal. The principal's (management's) objective is to maximize the total expected payo (prot) net of wage paid to the employee across the two periods by choosing a contract (wage conditional on observables) to oer the employee at the beginning of each period. Let π t denote the prot gross of the expenditure on wages in period t, and let C t be the wage paid to the employee in period t. To simplify the presentation, assume no discounting. Then, the rm's problem is
The wage (contract) could depend on everything the principal observes prior to the oer or at the time of payment, as we assume the payment is done after the relevant period is over. However, the contract is restricted to provide non-negative pay to the employee for any outcome (limited liability). This could be justied, for example, because obtaining money from an employee who received no income in the current period may not be possible. Period t's prot is uncertain and depends on the employee's choice of the eort allocation e ≡ (x, y) ∈ R +2 where x and y are the two dimensions of eort. To be clear, we will call the vector e ≡ (x, y) the eort allocation, and the sum of eort components e ≡ x + y the total eort. Assume the employee has a per-period budget constraint on his total eort x it + y it ≤ e i , where e i depends on the employee's type, which can be high, h, or low, , that is, i ∈ { , h}.
Assume that besides the budget constraint on eort, the employee has no intrinsic disutility of eort.
To simplify the potential contract structures, we model prot as possibly attaining one of just two possible values, one of which is normalized to 1 and the other is denoted by −b, with b > 0, and model the eect of the employee's eort allocation as aecting the probability of achieving the high prot level. Assume that the probability of high prot increases in a(x, y) = x · y.
This probability is maximized at x = y = e i /2, i.e., the ecient eort allocation, which is also the most desired by the rm, is for the employee to equally split the total eort between the two eort components. For further simplication, we dene the gross of wages prot in such a way that the expected prot equals a(x, y) and, hence, refer to a as the employee's productivity.
We denote the productivity's maximal level by a i ≡ (e i /2) 2 and call it the ability of the type-i employee. In other words, the employee's productivity is his actual expected contribution to prots (gross of wages), while his ability is how much he can technically contribute if he were to maximize this contribution. Thus, the employee's ability is a characteristic of the employee, while his productivity is his choice variable constrained by his total ability.
The above assumptions on the expected prot imply the following gross prot function specication as a function of the employee's productivity:
π t (a it ) = 1, with probability (b + a it )/(b + 1);
where a it is the employee's choice of productivity in period t (as dened by his eort allocation through Equation (2) To satisfy the constraint that the probabilities of the two prot outcomes are positive, we need 0 ≤ e < e h ≤ 2.
(If e h = 2, the ecient allocation x = y = 1 leads to a h = 1.) To further simplify, assume e = 0 and e h = 2, so that a = 0 and a h = 1. Note that given a = 0, the allocation decision of the low type (allocating 0 across the two components) is immaterial. When a = 0, the probability of the prot being high (being 1) is b/(b + 1) and the probability of the prot being low (being −b) is 1/(b + 1). When a h = 1 and the agent chooses the ecient eort allocation, the rm gets the high prot with probability one.
Note that if the agent is choosing the ecient eort allocation, a low prot implies that the agent has low ability for sure, but a high prot does not necessarily imply that the agent has the high ability. Note also that the greater b is, the less informative the high prot will be of the employee's ability.
Although we assume that an employee does not have a disutility of eort in any combination (x, y) such that x + y ≤ e i , where i is the employee's type, the employee has an outside option z in the second period, such that the employee may not accept the second period contract. This outside option could come from the utility of working elsewhere or the second period cost of traveling to work. This outside option allows us to consider the rm's retention problem in the second period. For simplicity, we assume that z does not depend on the employee's type i. The outside option is zero in the rst period so the employee accepts any non-negative oer in the rst period.
6
To be more specic, assume that the second period's outside option z is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] . This outside option is known to the employee before his decision of whether to accept the second period oer, but may or may not be known to him before his choice of the eort allocation e 1 in the rst period. We rst assume that the employee does not know z before the eort-allocation stage of the rst period; he learns it just before he needs to decide whether to accept the second period's oer. We also later consider variations of the model to see how the results change if the employee can condition his eort allocation e 1 on the second period outside 6 To avoid potential incentives for employees to signal high ability through refusing a rst period oer in order to gain a higher wage in the second period, assume that the rm does not engage in hiring at all in the second period. From the equilibrium that we derive, such signaling will also not be optimal in this setting.
option z or if he has some (but not full) information about it.
In addition to choosing the contract to oer, the principal needs to decide whether to introduce measurement m(x) of the x-component of the employee's eort. We assume that the measurement of the y-component, beyond its inference from the prot realization and any available measurement of x, is not feasible. In order to reduce the complexity of the compensation structure, assume that m(x) may take only one of two values, call them 0 and 1, but the probability of the high measurement realization (1) increases in x. For analytical tractability assuming linearity and that the high type can ensure m(x) = 1 by allocating all eort toward x, we arrive at the following measurement specication:
m(x) = 1, with probability x/e h = x/2; 0, with probability 1 − x/e h = 1 − x/2.
Note that with this measurement technology and given the assumptions e = 0 and e h = 2, a measurement of 1 indicates that the agent has high ability, while a measurement of 0 does not necessarily indicate that the agent has low ability as long as the high ability agent is not expected to shift all his eort toward component x.
If measurement is introduced, the compensation in each period is a function of the current and past prots and measures of x. If measurement is not introduced, the compensation can only be a function of current and past prots. There are three conceptually dierent possibilities of the timing when m(x) is introduced: (1) after the employee decided on his eort allocation e 1 in the rst period; (2) before the employee decided on his eort allocation e 1 in the rst period, but after the rst period compensation rule was set (and it was done without having the possibility of measurement in mind), and (3) before the employee decided on his eort allocation e 1 in the rst period, and the rst period compensation rule was determined with the possibility of the measurement in mind. We consider each of these cases. In the next section, we consider the case in which the measurement of the component x is only possible in the rst period eort. In Section 5, we consider the case in which the measurement of component x is possible in both the rst and second periods.
Model Analysis
In this section, we rst derive the optimal compensation schedule in the benchmark case when the measurement of x is not a possibility. We then consider how the second period's compensation and outcomes are aected if the measurement of the rst period's component x of the eort is unexpectedly introduced in period 1 after the employee already committed to his rst period's eort allocation. Next, we consider how the outcomes change if the employee optimally responds to the presence of the measurement of the rst period eort, but assuming that the rst period's compensation rule is unchanged after the measurement is unexpectedly introduced.
Conceptually, the last consideration is when the measurement introduction was unexpected by the rm, while the earlier one is when it was unexpected by the employee. Finally, we consider optimal compensation contracts in both periods given that the measurement of the rst period's
x component is present, or is expected to be introduced. Comparing the outcomes under the last scenario with the previous ones, we show that the introduction of measurement could be detrimental to the principal and to social welfare. The case of measurement of x component in both periods is presented in Section 5.
Benchmark Case: Optimal Contract without Measurement
Given that the employee's outside option is zero in the rst period and that he does not have an intrinsic preference of how to allocate the maximum eort e i at his disposal, compensation C 1 = ε1 π 1 =1 with ε > 0 achieves ecient allocation (so far as the employee does not expect the second period contract to provide perverse incentives for the employee to lower the rm's expectation of their abilities).
7 Thus, in equilibrium, we have ecient eort allocation and C 1 = 0, i.e., the rst-best for the principal (as contracts are not allowed to have negative pay).
In the second period, the problem is slightly more complicated. As the outside option is now positive and uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the employee has a positive chance of leaving and a 7 The term 1 condition is the indicator functions and takes the value of 1 if the condition is true, and takes the value of 0 otherwise.
positive chance of staying given any reasonable oer.
8 Consider the second period's contract
where c 1 ≥ 0 and c 2 ≥ 0 are the rm's decision variables and are functions of the observables after the rst period (i.e., functions of π 1 ). Thus in this benchmark case c 1 and c 2 may be functions of the rst period's prot realization and are non-negative to ensure a non-negative wage in any possible outcome.
9
Given this contract, the expected pay of the employee with ability
if the employee chooses the ecient eort allocation, which is assured by c 2 > 0. Since the outside option is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], this expected pay is also the probability that the employee stays. The expected net second period prot from the type-i employee who is staying and allocating his eort optimally for the rm is
if the probability that the employee is of high type is P h , the expected net prot is
Note that P h is the posterior probability of the employee having the high ability given the observables after the rst period, i.e., the rst period prot in this case. Maximizing the expected prot with respect to c 1 and c 2 under the constraint that c 1 ≥ 0 (since a negative wage is not allowed), we nd that the optimal second period's contract has c 1 = 0 and c 2 =
Note that as b increases from zero to innity, the weight c 2 on the prot decreases from half of 8 Since prot is either one or negative, the optimal contract cannot provide expected utility to the employee that exceeds the outside option with probability one.
9 Although c 2 < 0 is technically allowed as far as c 1 + c 2 ≥ 0, it is straightforward to check that it cannot be a part of an optimal contract it would give an incentive to ineciently allocate eort without the benet of higher retention of the high type employees.
the high type ability (1/2) to half the expected ability of the employee (P h /2). This is because as b increases, the prot realization becomes less informative of the employee's ability. Therefore, given the prot-based-only incentive (c 1 = 0), for low b, the contract gives a low expected payo to a low-ability employee and therefore, only the high-ability employee accepts the contract with a reasonable probability. But for high b, contract acceptance becomes less dependent on the employee's ability. Note also that if P h = 1, then the rm is indierent between any c 1 > 0 and c 2 > 0 as far as their sum is the same; this is because π 2 = 1 for sure for the high type. But if P h < 1, the above solution is uniquely optimal.
By dierentiating c 2 with respect to P h , one can see that the optimal oer increases in the principal's belief about the employee's ability:
This means that if there is some way for the employee to demonstrate high ability without incurring a signicant cost, he would strictly prefer to do so. This is the key to the result that a performance measurement of one eort component would be used by the high type employee to convince the employer that he is of high type at a cost of the rst period prot. Of course, if prot is itself very informative or if the weight on the rst period prot is suciently high, then this rst period possible distortion by the employee may not happen. Also note that the above inequality means that, eectively, the expectation of the second period's contract puts an implicit positive weight on the rst period's prot (since all else being equal, π 1 = 1 implies a higher probability of the high type than π 1 = 0 does), which gives the employee a strictly positive incentive to allocate the rst period's eort correctly. That is, even though the rst period's equilibrium contract leaves the employee indierent as to how to allocate his eort if the employee were myopic, the equilibrium is actually strict due to the expected-by-the-employee second period contract's positive dependence on the rst period's prot realization.
To complete the derivation of the equilibrium outcomes in the benchmark case, when the performance measurement is absent, it remains to derive the posterior probability P h that the employee is of high type as a function of the rst period's prot. Rational expectations also implies that this is what the rm expects). By Bayes' rule:
, and Pr(h|π 1 = −b) = 0.
Substituting these in Equation (7), we obtain the second period payment C 2 to the employee as a function of the rst and second period prots:
The expected net-of-wages prot is 1/2 in the rst period (it is equal to 1 if the employee is of high ability and 0 if he is of low ability) and
in the second period. This follows from substituting the optimal contract conditional on π 1 = 1, equation (10), into the expected prot, equation (6), and multiplying it by the probability that
. Note that the eventuality of π 1 = −b does not enter because it implies the employee is of low type and therefore, results in C 2 = 0 and no retention.
For example, for b = 0, we have C 2 = 1/2 · 1 π 1 =π 2 =1 , E(π 2 − C 2 ) = 1/8, and the expected total net prot of 5/8. 10 For b = 10, we have C 2 = 0.29 · 1 π 1 =π 2 =1 , E(π 2 − C 2 ) = 0.07, and the expected total net prot of 0.57. As b → ∞, we have C 2 → 1/4, E(π 2 − C 2 ) → 1/16, and the expected total net prot converging to 9/16.
Intuitively, the second period's and the total net prots decline with b as the rst period 10 Note that the assumption of relatively low retention rate (relatively high outside option) forces the prot to be low in the second period both due to the low retention probability and the extra expenditure on wages.
However, reducing the upper bound on the outside option would complicate the analysis as it would require considering the boundary case of the retention probability equal to one under a potentially optimal contract. One possibility to bring the rst and second period's prots closer without changing the eects presented would be to consider z to be a mixture of 0 and the uniform component (i.e., a mass point at zero and the rest of the distribution still uniform on [0, 1]).
prot becomes less informative of the employee's ability when b increases, and the resulting less ecient retention is detrimental to both the rm and, on average (across employee types), to the employee. In particular, as b increases from zero to innity, the high type employee's expected surplus (over the outside option z) from the second period compensation decreases from 1/8 to 1/32, while the low type employee's surplus increases from zero to 1/32, resulting in the average employee surplus decreasing from 1/16 to 1/32. Note that the average wage remains the same, but the expected value of it decreases because the value of C 2 to the employee is
Finally, note that the analysis and all the results of the benchmark case apply whether the employee knows his second period outside option at the beginning of the game or only just before his decision on whether to accept the second period oer. This is because in equilibrium, the employee allocates the eort eciently in the rst period regardless of whether he plans to leave or stay with the rm in the second period.
Unexpected Measurement Introduced After First Period's Eort Allocation
Now consider a situation in which the measurement is unexpectedly introduced after the rst period's eort allocation. This is an o-equilibrium case since we assume that the employee expects to be in the situation of the benchmark case, i.e., he does not expect performance measurement, but the rm then introduces the performance measurement. Thus, the results of this case are going to be used to understand the driving forces and incentives to introduce the performance measurement, and not as predictions in and of themselves. This case is also useful for understanding and predicting what the employees should expect if the rm is unable to commit to whether it would, or would not, introduce a performance measurement mid-game.
In this case, the rst period contract, eort allocation, and prots are the same as in the previous case since the rm can do no better and the employees do not expect any measurement to occur. But the second period's contract can now be conditioned not only on π t (t = 1, 2) but also on the measurement realization m(x 1 ). 11
11 The case when the second period contract can also be conditioned on the second period's measurement did not expect the performance measurement, Bayes' rule now gives the following probabilities of the employee being of the high type conditional on the realizations of π 1 and m(x 1 ):
Note that the event {π 1 = −b & m(x 1 ) = 1} does not occur if eort is allocated eciently, so the Bayes' rule does not apply in that case. Therefore, Pr(h|π 1 = −b & m(x 1 ) = 1) could take any value. We set this value at 1 because a low type employee could never get m(x 1 ) = 1, while a high type employee could get π 1 = −b and m(x 1 ) = 1 by not choosing an ecient eort allocation. In other words, this belief assignment is required for an equilibrium to be sequential.
However, the results below would also hold if any other value is assumed.
As the new observable in the second period is only π 2 , Equation (7) continues to hold with P h now depending on both the rst period's prot and on the rst period's measurement of x according to (12) above. Thus, the optimal second period contract oer is c 2 1 π 2 =1 , where
While the rst period decisions and, hence prot, are the same as in the benchmark case, the optimal contract above leads to the expected second period net prot of
As b increases from zero to innity, the above prot decreases from 1/8 to 1/12. Given that the rm now has better information about the employee's ability in the current case relative to the benchmark, as one would expect, the high type employee retention is higher, the low type realization m(x 2 ) is considered in Section 5. employee retention is lower, and the prot and average employee surplus is increased.
Measurement Introduced Before First Period's Eort Allocation
Consider now that the measurement was introduced when the rst period compensation was set to zero, as in the benchmark case (Section 4.1), but before the employee decides on his eort allocation. Then, the employee knows that the manager will observe the measure m(x 1 ) at the end of the rst period. Then, it is a dominant strategy for the high type employee to fully distort his rst period eort allocation toward the x component. This is because demonstrating high type increases the expected payo in the second period in some instances but in no instance decreases it.
Therefore, the expected rst period prot is reduced to zero. The expected second period prot increases to 1/2·(1−1/2)·1/2 = 1/8, which is the probability of the employee being the high type (given the full eort allocation distortion, such an employee is precisely identied by m(x 1 )) multiplied by the net prot from a retained high type employee multiplied by the probability of retention of a high type employee given the optimal contract. Note that relative to the benchmark case, the expected second period net prot increases due to the better identication and the better retention of the high type employees, but the rst period prot suers. The net eect is that the total net prot of 1/8 becomes even lower than the rst period prot of the benchmark case alone, Eπ 1 = 1/2.
The negative impact of the measurement on the rst period eort allocation due to the expected second period contract adjustment leads to the idea that the rst period's incentive to distort eort allocation should be countered in the rst period compensation package. We consider this strategy in the following subsection. But rst, to illustrate the diculty of countering the rst period distortion, let us derive the high type employee's benet of the maximal distortion in the rst period relative to no distortion assuming that the rm does not expect a distortion.
12
12 The benet would be even higher if the rm expects a distortion towards x > 1, since in that case the high type employee is better identied and, therefore, the second period contract oer following m(x 1 ) = 0 would be even lower, while the oer following m(x 1 ) = 1 would be the same and equal to c 2 = 1/2. The employee's benet of distortion comes from the possibility of the {π 1 = 1 & m 1 = 0} outcome in the rst period. In this case, which has probability 1/2 from the high type employee's point of view, the expected second period oer is c 2 = c 2 , dened in (13)). The employee will accept it with probability c 2 , achieving an average surplus, over the outside option and given acceptance, of c 2 /2. Thus the expected second period's surplus contribution of this event (π 1 = 1 & m(x 1 ) = 0) to the employee's expected utility is c 2 /4. If the high type employee converts this outcome to m(x 1 ) = 1, the surplus is calculated similarly but with c 2 replaced by 1/2, which results in the expected surplus of 1/16. For example, for b = 10, the benet is .0525, which can be seen as quite substantial when compared to the expected second period's net prot of .07, derived in Section 4.1. This example illustrates that convincing employees not to distort the rst period's eort allocation is going to be quite costly to the rm relative to its expected second period's net prot. On the other hand, as we have seen above, not countering the maximal distortion is quite detrimental to the rst period prot.
The above analysis was performed under the assumption that the employee does not know the second period's outside option value z before allocating eort in the rst period. Let us now consider what happens if the employee knows z before allocating eort in the rst period. As presented above, we only need to consider the high type employee's eort allocation decisions, as the low type employee can only exert zero eort. In this case, if z ≥ 1/2, the high type employee, in equilibrium, does not value the possible second period oers and thus will, in equilibrium, eciently allocate his eort in the rst period. If z < 1/2, the high type employee strictly prefers to show that he is of the high type to receive the second period oer with c 2 = 1/2.
Therefore, he will distort his eort maximally. Thus the high type employee distorts his eort with probability of one half, and if he distorts it, he does so maximally. Therefore, the rst period prot becomes 1 2
. Since all employees who can potentially stay distort their eort maximally in the rst period, the second period's net prot is the same as in the case where employees did not know their outside oer, i.e., 1/8. 13 Thus, the total prot becomes 3/8, which 13 Note that not everything is the same in the second period: given the employee strategy, the rm optimally updates its belief about the outside option of the employees based on the prot and performance measurement realization. Eectively, m(x 1 ) = 0 signals that the employee expects a high outside option or is of low ability.
is still lower than even the rst period prot alone in the benchmark case. Note that in this case, the benet of distortion is not the same for all employees who distort their eort allocation:
those with z close to 1/2 are almost indierent between distorting and not distorting their eort allocation, while those with z below c 2 oered in the {π 1 = 1 & m(x 1 ) = 0} outcome have the highest incentive to distort.
Measurement Introduced Before First Period's Contract
We now turn to the main case of the contract design when all the parties know at the beginning of the game that the measurement was introduced. Since distorting x upward from the ecient allocation in the rst period reduces the rst period's expected prots due to the increased x 1 , the principal may try, at least partially, to counteract this rst period's distortion in the rst period's contract by a combination of (a) paying for π 1 = 1 when m(x 1 ) = 1, (b) paying
clearly worse than (b) as it allocates more spending toward low type employees and provides less incentive to eciently allocate eort to increase prot. The relative optimality of the rst two instruments is less straightforward. Still, for b > 4, an increase in the weight on outcome in (a) is counter-productive (increasing x increases the probability of this outcome when b ≥ 4). 14 Therefore, for large b, the optimal contract will involve a positive pay only on the outcome in (b). This is intuitive as such a contract gives employees the incentive to move x down towards the ecient amount both through conditioning on π 1 being high (prot sharing incentivizes an ecient allocation) and through conditioning on m(x 1 ) being low (an incentive to reduce x from whatever level it would be otherwise set).
Consider now the conditions under which a high type employee prefers no distortion to the maximal distortion given the rst period incentive C 1 = c1 π 1 =1,m(x 1 )=0 assuming that the But this feature does not aect the expected prot. This is because the probability of a high type given this realization is less then 1/2 (all low-ability but not all high-ability employees have this measurement). Therefore, the rm will not be willing to oer more than c 2 = 1/2. This means that the high type employees who planned to leave will still leave and, therefore, it is still optimal for the rm to oer precisely zero compensation having observed m(x 1 ) = 0. 14 For a high type employee the probability of the outcome
, which is increasing in x 1 ∈ [0, 2] when b ≥ 4.
rm expects no distortion. Note that the maximal distortion redistributes the event {π 1 = 1 & m(x 1 ) = 0}, which for a high type employee with no distortion has probability 1/2, to the event {π 1 = 1 & m(x 1 ) = 1} with (total additional) probability
and to the event {π 1 = 0 & m(x 1 ) = 1} with (total additional) probability
. Each of these cases leads to an increase in the second period's oer from c 2 = c 2 derived in Subsection 4.2 to 1/2, and results in a loss of the rst period's incentive c. Note that the benet of increased pay in the second period needs to be counted net of foregoing the outside option and taking into account the probability of staying with the rm. In other words, the expected benet of a contract with the expected pay of w is w 0 (w − z) dz = w 2 /2. Thus, to prevent a high type employee deviation to the full distortion of x, we need
2 .
(15)
Let us now consider the possibility of the employee partially distorting his eort allocation. It turns out that while given the incentive c1 π 1 =1,m(x 1 )=0 , a high type employee chooses no distortion, any smaller incentive leads to the maximal distortion. This is because the high type employee's expected payo as a function of the rst period's x 1 is tilde-shaped: the employee's payo as a function of x 1 has a maximum at x 1 below 1/4 for incentives strictly higher than c. For incentives lower than c the global maximum of his payo is x 1 = 2. The Appendix has the detailed proof that preventing maximal distortion prevents any distortion towards x > 1. Again, note that if the rm expects some deviation, then the employee has an even higher incentive to distort, because c 2 oered in the event {π 1 = 1 & m(x 1 ) = 0} becomes lower. Therefore, (16) establishes a lower bound on the rst period's contract incentive necessary to prevent the high type employees from maximal distortion of their eort allocation in the rst period toward the x component.
Consider now if it is benecial for the principal to incentivize no distortion in the rst period.
(As we established above, this needs to be compared to the maximal distortion.) Given no eort distortion in the rst period, the low type employee will get c with probability
, and the high type employee will get c with probability 1/2. The expected cost for the principal of incentivizing no distortion in the rst period is therefore 1+3b 4(1+b)
c. The expected gross benet of incentivizing no distortion (relative to full distortion) in the rst period is 1/2.
The employee's eort allocation distortion in the rst period would help the prot in the second period due to allowing a superior second period's contract (due to the employee's ability being fully revealed). The value of this to the principal is 1 8
(1+2b)(1+b+b 2 ) (1+3b+3b 2 +3b 3 ) (the rst term is the second period prot given maximal rst period distortion derived in Section 4.3; the second one is the second period prot given no rst period distortion derived in Section 4.2). We can then obtain that the benet of countering the maximal distortion is higher than the total cost of doing so. Given that the principal counters the distortion, the rst period's prot (net of the cost of preventing the distortion) becomes 1 2
c and the total net prot becomes
which is smaller than the total net prot in the benchmark case. For example, for b → ∞, the net prot converges to 1/2, which is smaller than the net prot when the measurement was not possible (which tends to 9/16), but greater than the net prot would be if the rm did not counter the rst period distortion (0 + 1/8 = 1/8). Summarizing the results of this subsection, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Suppose that b is suciently large (e.g., b > 4), and that employees do not know their second period outside option z before allocating their rst period eort. Then, if the measurement of one of the eort components is implemented at the start of the game, we have:
1. The rm chooses to incentivize employees not to distort their rst period eort allocation.
This results in a loss in the rst period's prot but with no change in eciency.
2. The rm uses the rst period's measurement for a better retention of high type employees in the second period. This is (on average) benecial to the high type employees and detrimental to the low type employees, and results in increased second period's prots.
3. The net result of the two eects above is that the total net prot decreases, while the employees, on average, are better o.
Social welfare increases.
The proposition states the results for b large, but we could not nd values of b > 0 such that any of statements of this proposition did not hold. The proposition states that there is no loss of eciency in the rst period and that social welfare increases.
We now discuss now generality of these two results, when productive employees are heterogeneous in the rst period. As we show below, the incentive to distort may be too large and the rm may then choose not to counter it. This can then lead to the possibility of welfare losses due to the lower productivity. In fact, if the productive employees are heterogeneous in the rst period, there could be no way to design an incentive to not distort eort. To show this within this model, let us get back to the possibility that the employees have some information about their second period's outside option before they choose their rst period's eort allocation.
In contrast to the previous model analysis, now assume that at the beginning of the rst period, the employees know z precisely. In this case, if measurement is introduced, employees who know that they are going to leave for sure, e.g., those with z > 1/2, do not have an incentive
to distort x 1 unless the rst period contract provides them with an incentive to distort eort.
Therefore, since potentially half of the productive employees will leave, when designing the incentive structure to induce no (or less) distortion by the other employees, the rm needs to make sure that the incentive is not strong enough to fully distort the eort allocation of the employees who will leave. The rm can use a combination of a positive weight on the rst period prot π 1 to incentivize no distortion of those planning to leave, and an additional incentive through a positive weight on m(x 1 ) = 0.
The optimal wage for π 1 cannot be higher than 2, as that is the maximum possible output over two periods of a high ability employee. Therefore, the maximal incentive that it provides tends to zero as b tends to innity. This implies that if any weight is put on m(x 1 ) = 0 in the rst period contract, as b tends to innity, the employees that are expecting to leave the rm for sure (i.e., those with z > 1/2) will distort their eort allocation maximally toward the lowest x 1 (i.e., towards x 1 = 0). As the rm benets from identifying the type of the employees who are staying with the organization for better retention eciency in the second period, it prefers those employees who will stay to distort their eort allocation as opposed to the employees who will leave. Therefore, not to have the employees who will leave distort their eort allocation fully, the optimal weight on m(x 1 ) = 0 must tend to zero as b tends to innity. That is, as b tends to innity, the rst period contract approaches the form p1 π 1 =1 (for some non-negative p).
Again, as the optimal p is bounded from above (as it is by 2), the incentive it provides not to distort the eort allocation tends to zero as b tends to innity. Therefore, as b tends to innity, almost all employees who will stay distort their eort allocation maximally. 2. The mass of employees who leave and distort their rst period eort in an amount converging to zero converges to 1/2.
3. The total net prot and the social welfare are lower than if the measurement were not introduced.
To see the social welfare result, note that without the measurement of x the total production created by the organization is the share of the high type employees being employed times their productivity, which is 1 2 in the rst period and c 2 2 in the second period for a total of 1+ c 2 2
. Adding to this the expected total outside option obtained by the employees who leave, one obtains the total production created as
where the second term represents the expected value of the outside option of the high type employees who leave in the second period, the third term represents the expected value of the outside option of the low type employees who did not get positive output in the rst period (all of these employees leave in the second period), and the fourth term represents the expected value of the outside option of the low type employees who received positive output in the rst period.
When b → ∞, we have c 2 → 1/4 and, therefore, the total production tends to 35/32. With measurement, when b → ∞, half of the high type employees maximally distort their eort allocation in the rst period, but all of these stay in the second period, which results in the total production of the rm being 1/2(1/2 + 1/2) = 1/2. Adding to this the expected total outside option obtained by the employees who leave, one obtains the total production created converging
where the second term captures the expected value of the outside option of the high type employees who leave in the second period, and the third term is the expected value of the outside option of the low type employees in the second period. (All leave in the second period as the measurement reveals that they are low type.)
Comparing (18) for b → ∞ with (19), we obtain that the social welfare with measurement is lower than without measurement.
Note that in a more complete model, which would account for the origins of the outside option and the benet to other rms of employees leaving this rm, one can argue that any information asymmetry between rms and employees is welfare reducing, as it results in inecient allocation of employees across rms. (Essentially, wages may be only reallocating surplus from rms to employees, but unequal wages, due to dierent information that dierent rms have about the employee, means that the employee may stay at a less preferable rm.) Such consideration of the social desirability of retention eorts is beyond the scope of this paper.
Proposition 2 shows how some heterogeneity among high type employees (namely, their knowledge of dierent outside option values in the second period) results in the inability of the rm to prevent employee eort distortion in the rst period by up to one half of the employees. The only reason most employees did not distort eort is that half of the employees were essentially homogenous: the eort allocation of those who know they will be leaving for sure is not aected by the exact value of the outside option. With more heterogeneity in the employee beliefs about the probability of leaving, one could obtain that, although in aggregate the rm may incentivize any proportion of x and y eorts, it may be that nearly all employees maximally distort their eort. The Appendix provides an example of such a model variation.
Although in all the dierent set-ups above, we have that measurement, on average, benets the high type employees, one can now see that introducing a rst period outside option or competition between organizations, so that the employees may share the expected welfare surplus from employment through the rst period oer, could lead to the introduction of measurement decreasing the payos of the employees and the organization alike.
Measurement of Effort in Both Periods
In this section we investigate what happens when the measurement of component x can be done in both periods. In other words, we consider the analysis of the previous section with the added possibility of m(x 2 ) being also available. As we will see, this brings additional complexity into the analysis without aecting the main messages of the previous section. For analytical tractability, we perform this analysis focusing on large b.
Unexpected Measurement Introduced After First Period's Eort Allocation
Consider rst the case in which there is an unexpected introduction of the measurement after the rst period's eort allocation. Just as in the analysis of Section 4.2, in the second period, uncertainty about the employee's type remains only if m(x 1 ) = 0.
In this case, if m(x 2 ) is also observable and absent concerns about the second period eort allocation, the principal may want to put a positive weight on the second period measurement for a better retention of the high type employees. This is so when m(x 2 ) is informative of the employee's ability on top of the information derived from the rst period observables (π 1 and m(x 1 )) and the second period prot realization π 2 . If eort is eciently allocated in the rst period, this would be when π 1 = 1 and m(x 1 ) = 0 (otherwise, rst period observations reveal the type).Thus, one can expect a strictly positive weight on 1 m(x 2 )=1 in the second period contract when (and only when) m(x 1 ) = 0. 15 The only reason that this weight may not be positive is if it could lead to a second period's eort allocation distortion and the manager nds this suboptimal.
The outcome of this trade-o depends on the probability of the employee being a high type: if this probability is lower, the benet of identifying the high type (and not spending on the low type) is higher.
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 2, for any positive incentive on m(x 2 ), as b → ∞, a high type employee will distort the eort allocation in the second period maximally. Since maximal distortion leads to zero productivity, for large b the weight on m(x 2 ) must be small and, therefore, most of the pay comes from the weight on π 2 (clearly, a weight on π 2 is better than a constant component, so the constant will not be used). Thus, asymptotically, the second period outcomes are as if the measurement did not exist in the second period. That is, the results of Section 4.2 apply here asymptotically for large b.
For an illustration, consider the objective function of a high type employee who has a contract c 2 1 π 2 =1 (1 + w 2 m(x 2 )) for some c 2 > 0 and w 2 > 0. If the employee chooses eort allocation x 2 , hos expected wage is:
15 Note that this could look as a special treatment for apparent (i.e., as measured) substandard employees to encourage improvement. This is not exactly the case because achieving m 1 (x 1 ) = 1 leads to not lower expected compensation in the second period for retention reasons.
Note that, asymptotically, for small w 2 , the optimal x 2 equals 1 + 1+b 4 w 2 . Using the decision rule given by (21), we can now write the rst-order conditions with respect to c 2 and w 2 on the second period prot in the case {π 1 = 1 & m(x 2 ) = 0} using the probability of the high type given in (12). The analysis is presented in the Appendix. For b = 10 we can obtain c 2 = .20 and w 2 = .02, resulting in x 2 = 1.05.
Unexpected Measurement Introduced After First Period Contract but Before First Period Eort Allocation
In this case, exactly as in the case of Section 4.3, all employees maximally distort their eort allocation in the rst period. The rst period's measurement m(x 1 ) is then fully informative about the employee's type and, thus, exactly the same outcomes follow. Note that in the rst period, employees may expect the second period oer following m(x 1 ) = 0 to have some positive weight on m(x 2 ), but since any signicant weight on m(x 2 ) would result in the maximal distortion (for suciently large b) and therefore, zero expected prots, the second period oer that the employees may expect following m(x 1 ) = 0 is strictly worse than the second period oer that they expect following m(x 1 ) = 1, which is 1/2 · 1 π 2 =1 . Therefore, the maximal eort distortion in the rst period guaranteeing m(x 1 ) = 1 is strictly optimal for the employees. Again, note that the rst period prot loss due to this distortion in the rst period is 1/2.
Measurement Introduced Before the First Period Contract
In this case, it follows from the results in the previous section that the rm will want to prevent maximal distortion. As the second period oer given no distortion is asymptotically the same as if the measurement in the second period did not exist, the results of Section 4.4 hold here asymptotically. We thus conrm all the results of Propositions 1 and 2, except that the rm uses the second period measurement for retention in a small amount.
Discussion
One may nd it curious to reect on the Finnish education achievement puzzle from the point of view oered by the above model. As demonstrated by eventual student abilities, Finland was able to improve performance by largely eliminating both the teacher and student performance measurements (see Darling-Hammond 2010) .
A tenure system may also be considered as a commitment to limit the use of measurements.
For example, a standard justication for life-time appointments of justices is that otherwise they could be swayed by unscrupulous decision makers. Our research puts it in a dierent light: even if the supervisors are fully benevolent (they only have the objective of maximizing public welfare) and are fully rational, they may not be able to not interfere and not distort the socially ecient decisions of the employees.
The considerations illustrated by the model easily apply to not-for-prot organizations. In such organizations, the productivity/output (a) in fact may not be observable at all in the absence of measurement, yet the organization cares about it by denition. Note that any measurement of the eorts or productivity components might have the property of not being completely unbiased between the dierent components of output, i.e., almost always under or over-weigh one type of the input eorts. Furthermore, both the employees and the management of such organizations may have pride in their work, which leads to the employees preferring to optimize a absent other incentives (in the model, due to a small weight on the total output of the rm). The management, while by denition may be interested in the good deeds a brought to the society, also prides itself in the amount of work done by its particular organization, and therefore values the retention of the productive (i.e., high-a) employees.
Note further that retention by itself is not necessarily socially desirable. In the model we formulated, it is ecient (socially desirable) to retain an employee if and only if the employee's outside option z is less then the productive output a he can generate. Therefore, it is ecient to oer a better contract (higher base pay) to those employees who are expected to be more productive. As we have shown, the rm may be worse o, although the employees and the social welfare are better o in our model when the principal is willing and able to incentivize employees not to distort their eort allocation in the rst period (although social welfare is lower in the model variation where employees observe their second period's outside oer before the rst period). However, another interpretation is that z comes from the idiosyncratic employee preferences for outside attributes such as job location plus a job oer from an organization with exactly the same production function. In this case, given equal pay (contracts), employees would produce the same a's but realize the best possible location choice, i.e., the location-inconvenience cost would be minimized. Employee retention then makes utility generated by locations ineciently distributed while only shifting a's between organizations. Then, the management's work (introducing measurements and ne-tuning contracts) could make both the organization and, on average, the employees worse o (although some employees may be better o ). The model can then be the most strikingly characterized as exploring the tug of war between the employees' pride in their work being a force toward the ecient society and the managerial pride in their work being a force against eciency and toward a distortion of both the employees' eort allocation and the employee locations.
Of course, in many other situations, the problem of eort inducement and employee retention is the main problem an organization faces, and the problem of optimal eort allocation between unobserved (not well-measured) components is not as essential. In those cases, performance measurements could benet the organization and an average employee. The point of this paper is not that performance measurement is always or even usually counter-productive, but that it could be, hence one should consider the implications of measurement before its introduction. In other words, one should have an idea of how data is to be used before collecting it.
employee strictly prefer no distortion to any intermediate distortion. Furthermore,
In other words, f (x, c) decreases in c and the speed (by absolute value) of this decrease increases in x. This implies that if for some x 1 < x 2 , we have f (x 1 , c 1 ) ≤ f (x 2 , c 1 ), then for any c < c 1 ,
we have f (x 1 , c) < f (x 2 , c). Applying this to c 1 = c and x 2 = 2, we obtain that for any smaller incentive than c (i.e., for c < c), we have that the eort allocation x = 2 is preferable to any eort allocation x ∈ [1, 2). Conversely, any incentive larger than c results in x < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Fix arbitrary p m > 0 and w > 0, and consider a high type employee decision on his rst period eort allocation given the rst period contract p1 π 1 =1 − w m(x 1 ) with p ≤ p m . We rst prove that for suciently high b, an employee with z > 1/2 (i.e., an employee who is sure to leave in the second period) will distort his rst period eort allocation to x 1 = 0. To see this,
which means that for b > 4pm−w w , the above derivative becomes smaller than w 2pm . Therefore, for b > 4pm−w w , the expected rst period pay of a high type employee decreases in x 1 for all x 1 ∈ (0, 2) given the contract considered above. Therefore, given the above rst period contract, an employee who knows for sure he will leave (i.e., who does not care about the second period contract) will choose
Facing the above choice of high type employees with z > 1/2, the rm would prefer to instead have employees with z > 1/2 not distort their eort allocation from the optimal one (x 1 = 1) at all, while having the rest of the employees distort the eort allocation maximally upward (i.e., choose x 1 = 2). Since the latter outcome is achieved with the zero-pay contract, the former contract cannot be optimal. Thus w of the optimal contract must tend to zero as b tends to innity. (Otherwise, its optimality for suciently large b is contradicted by the above observation that the zero pay contract is strictly better.)
Now, x arbitrary z max < 1/2 and x * 1 ∈ [0, 2), and consider a high type employee with the second period outside option z ≤ z max . As derived in the main text, the second period contract provides the high type employee the expected second period pay of 1/2 following m(x 1 ) = 1 and strictly lower following {m(x 1 ) = 0 & π 1 = −b} or {m(x 1 ) = 0 & π 1 = 1}. Let c m < 1/2 be the highest pay out of the latter two. Then increasing x 1 from x * 1 to 2 increases the expected pay (conditional on the employee accepting the oer) in the second period by at least
(1/2 − c m ) with probability (1 − x * 1 /2) and never decreases it (once x 1 = 2, the expected pay is always 1/2). The employee values this expected increase in the second period oer by at least
(1−x * 1 /2) min{1/2−z max , 1/2−c m }. Remember that we have established above that the optimal w of the optimal rst period contract p1 π 1 =1 − w m(x 1 ) tends to zero as b tends to innity, and that p ≤ 2 in an optimal contract. Therefore, the marginal penalty from increasing x 1 coming from the rst period's optimal contract tends to zero as b → ∞. Therefore, for large enough b, all high type employees with z < z max will choose x 1 = 2.
We have thus established the rst part of the proposition. Note also that it then follows that as b → ∞, almost all the employees with z < 1/2 stay in the second period. (To be precise, for all z max < 1/2, for suciently high b, all employees with z ≤ z max will maximally distort the rst period eort allocation and will be guaranteed the expected pay of 1/2 in the second period, and therefore, stay for sure.) Thus, employees with z > 1/2 form almost all employees who leave.
Eort distortion of employees with z > 1/2 has to tend to zero as b → ∞, because since nearly all the rest of the employees distort maximally, zero-pay contract (and the resulting noeort distortion by the employees with z > 1/2) would be better otherwise. This establishes the second part of the proposition. The last part and the social welfare result have been calculated in the main text (based on the rst two). This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Case When Employees Have Partial Information about Second Period Outside
Option:
Assume now the following information structure the employee has at the beginning of the game about his second period outside option. Assume at the beginning of the game that the employee has a signal (k, σ) about his second period outside option, where k ∈ {0, . . . , K} represents the reliability of σ and is uniformly distributed on {0, . . . , K}, while σ is equal to 1 z>1/2 with probability k/K and is a random draw from {0, 1} otherwise. Each of these 2K + 2 possible (and equally likely) signals corresponds to a dierent value that the high type employee receiving such a signal places on the second period equilibrium oer.
Let c 2 be the equilibrium second period c 2 when π 1 = 1 & m(x 1 ) = 0 and the manager expects ecient eort allocation in the rst period (by the same argument as in Section 4.2, if the manager expects a distortion, c 2 will be lower). As before, by maximally distorting the x component of eort upwards, the high type employee can increase c 2 and, therefore, the value of the second period oer (since it can ensure π 2 = 1 by allocating eort eciently in the second period), to 1/2. Again, as before, the value of this action equals the probability of accepting the contract with c 2 = 1/2 times the expected increase in the payo (which is 1/2 − max{z, c 2 }) conditional on accepting the second period oer. The dierence lies in the evaluation of the probability of accepting the oer, which now is a function of the signal (k, σ).
Signal (k, σ) is uninformative with probability 1−k/K. In this case, z is uniformly distributed on (0, 1) and therefore, the value of increasing c 2 from c 2 to 1/2 is v ≡ (1/2 − c 2 ) · c 2 + 1/2 c 2 (1/2 − z) dz. With probability k/K, the signal is informative. In this case, if σ = 1, the employee is sure to leave even with c 2 = 1/2 and, therefore, has no value of increasing the second period oer. However, if σ = 0 (and the signal is true), the employee is sure to stay and values increasing the oer at 2v . Aggregating the above (taking into account the probability of the event {π 1 = 1 & m(x 1 ) = 0}), we nd the values v k,σ the high type employee with signal (k, σ) places on increasing the second period oer. These values are ordered as:
These values represent the incentive the employee has to maximally distort his eort allocation toward x = 2 given signal (k, σ). Let dv be the smallest distance between any pair of the above values. Again, if the manager believes the eort allocation is distorted, dv will be greater. Thus, dv > 0 represents the lower bound on how dierent incentives are between the high type agents with dierent signals.
Similar to the argument leading to Proposition 2, one can now prove that if b is large enough, a potentially optimal rst period contract (e.g., one where the weight on π 1 is bounded from above by a number independent of b) may only incentivize noeort distortion by agents with one of the signal possibilities. The rest will be distorting x either maximally upward or maximally downward. Thus, for large K, almost all high type agents distort their rst period eort allocation maximally, and we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3: If employees have some information about their second period outside option, it is impossible to protably prevent maximal eort distortion by nearly all employees in the rst period.
Unexpected Measurement of the Second Period Effort After the First Period's Effort Allocation:
The optimal x 2 maximizes (20). Using implicit dierentiation of the rst order condition 4 + 4w 2 x 2 − 4x 2 − 3w 2 x 2 2 + w 2 b = 0 on the optimal x 2 , we obtain ∂x 2 ∂w 2 = 4x 2 − 3x 
where φ 10 is the probability of high type conditional on π 1 = 1&m(x 1 ) = 0 which is φ 10 = 1+b 1+3b
per (12), a = x 2 (2 − x 2 ), and x 2 is a function of w 2 , which is implicitly dened by the FOC on the employee's objective function (or explicitly by (21)).
The optimal c 2 and w 2 can then be found by taking the derivatives of (31) with respect to c 2 and w 2 , using (30) for the derivative of x 2 with respect to w 2 , and making those derivatives
